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“Ye Are No More Strangers and Foreigners”
Theological and Economic Perspectives on
the LDS Church and Immigration

Walker A. Wright

W

hile always a heated topic, immigration has once again taken center stage in political discourse across multiple countries in recent
years. The controversial debate surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis
was especially critical to the 2016 United States presidential election. In
response to the crisis, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
announced its “I Was a Stranger” relief effort, encouraging members—
and the women in particular—to seek out and assist refugees in their
local communities. With this contentious political climate in mind, this
paper will review the Church’s “I Was a Stranger” initiative as well as its
position on immigration. Furthermore, it will provide a brief scriptural
overview of migration and the covenant people’s responsibility toward
the poor and “the stranger.” After exploring the general public’s attitudes
toward immigration (including Mormons), the bulk of the paper will
review the empirical economic literature on immigration, demonstrating that (1) fears about immigration are often overblown or fueled by
misinformation and (2) liberalizing immigration restrictions would be
an incredibly effective antipoverty program. By favoring policies that
reflect the empirical evidence, Latter-day Saints can come closer to
achieving the Church’s “divinely appointed responsibilit[y]” of “caring
for the poor and needy.”1

1. Handbook 2: Administering the Church 2010 (Salt Lake City: The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2010), 9.
BYU Studies Quarterly 57, no. 1 (2018)65
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“I Was a Stranger”
In October 2015, the First Presidency released a letter responding to
the growing refugee crisis, encouraging members to “contribute to the
Church Humanitarian Fund” and “to participate in local refugee
relief projects, where practical.”2 A couple of months later, Republican
presidential candidate Donald Trump called “for a total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until [the] country’s
representatives can figure out what is going on.”3 The following day, the
Church published two statements from the Prophet Joseph Smith on
the importance of religious freedom, explaining that while the Church
“is neutral in regard to party politics and election campaigns, . . . it is not
neutral in relation to religious freedom.”4 The statement appeared to be
a direct counter to the proposed “shutdown” and the religious litmus
test it seemed to advocate.5 Both the timing of the Church’s statements
and the choice of quotations seem to indicate that restricting the flow
2. Sarah Jane Weaver, “October 2015 LDS First Presidency Letter on Refugees,”
Church News, March 26, 2016, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865650963/
LDS-First-Presidency-letter-on-refugees.html.
3. Jeremy Diamond, “Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S.,”
CNN, December 8, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald
-trump-muslim-ban-immigration/; Jenna Johnson, “Trump Calls for ‘Total
and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the United States,’ ” Washington Post, December 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-poli
tics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of
-muslims-entering-the-united-states/.
4. “Church Points to Joseph Smith’s Statements on Religious Freedom, Pluralism,” Newsroom—The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, December 8, 2015, http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/church-statement
-religious-freedom-pluralism.
5. Peggy Fletcher Stack, “Mormon Church Backs Religious Liberty after
Trump Comments,” Salt Lake Tribune, December 25, 2015, http://www.sltrib
.com/home/3282686-155/mormon-church-backs-religious-liberty-after; Tad
Walch, “LDS Church Releases Statement on Religious Freedom as Donald
Trump’s Muslim Controversy Swirls,” Deseret News, December 8, 2015, http://
www.deseretnews.com/article/865643265/LDS-Church-releases-statement
-on-religious-freedom-as-Donald-Trumps-Muslim-controversy-swirls.html.
Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric had led the Church-owned Deseret News to offer
some harsh criticisms of the candidate the month prior. See “In Our Opinion:
Trump Unmatched as a Candidate in Blatant Contempt for Basic 1st Amendment Freedoms,” Deseret News, November 27, 2015, http://www.deseretnews
.com/article/865642538/In-our-opinion-Trump-unmatched-as-a-candidate-in
-blatant-contempt-for-basic-1st-Amendment-freedoms.html?pg=all.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol57/iss1/4
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of migration based on religious association is out of harmony with the
Church’s current teachings.
In the spring of 2016, the “I Was a Stranger” initiative was
announced by then Relief Society General President Linda K. Burton
in the women’s session of general conference.6 Sister Burton made the
following remarks about the female-led effort: “It is our hope that you
will prayerfully determine what you can do—according to your own
time and circumstance—to serve the refugees living in your neighborhoods and communities. This is an opportunity to serve one on one, in
families, and by organization to offer friendship, mentoring, and other
Christlike service and is one of many ways sisters can serve. . . . Sisters,
we know that reaching out to others with love matters to the Lord.”7
The following weekend, Elder Patrick Kearon of the Seventy devoted
his general conference address to the plight of refugees. While “not
intend[ing] in any way to form part of [the] heated discussion, nor to
comment on immigration policy,” Elder Kearon nonetheless wanted
to “focus on the people who have been driven from their homes and
their countries by wars that they had no hand in starting.” Kearon
invited members to remember their own history as refugees as well as
Christ’s, particularly his family’s flight to Egypt to escape King Herod.
He encouraged Latter-day Saints to “think in terms of doing something
close to home, in your own community, where you will find people who
need help in adapting to their new circumstances.”8
In a letter sent that same month to stake, ward, and branch councils
worldwide, the First Presidency reminded members that “one of the fundamental principles of the restored gospel of Jesus Christ is to ‘impart of
your substance to the poor, every man according to that which he hath,
. . . administering to their relief, both spiritually and temporally, according to their wants’ (Mosiah 4:26). In harmony with our letter of October 27, 2015, the general presidencies of the Relief Society, Young Women,
and Primary invite women of all ages to join together to help refugees
6. Tad Walch, “LDS Church Launches ‘I Was a Stranger’ Website for Mormon Women’s Refugee Relief Effort,” Deseret News, March 28, 2016, http://www
.deseretnews.com/article/865651006/LDS-Church-launches-I-Was-a-Stranger
-website-for-Mormon-womens-refugee-relief-effort.html.
7. Linda K. Burton, “I Was a Stranger,” Ensign 46 (May 2016): 14, https://www
.lds.org/ensign/2016/05/general-womens-session/i-was-a-stranger?lang=eng.
8. Patrick Kearon, “Refuge from the Storm,” Ensign 46 (May 2016): 111, 113,
https://www.lds.org/ensign/2016/05/sunday-afternoon-session/refuge-from
-the-storm?lang=eng.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2018
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in their local communities.”9 Elder Jeffrey R. Holland later expressed
similar views in a 2016 conference on forced migration and religious
freedom. In one of his addresses, he highlighted the sexual violence
toward women that often occurs in the countries refugees are fleeing.10
After reviewing the history of early Mormon refugees who fled to Utah
to escape religious persecution, he stated that migrant beliefs and traditions “should be celebrated, not dismissed” and that refugees should
be given “greater organizational participation” and welcomed into the
“everyday lives” of local citizens.11
While these examples are largely confined to the recent refugee crisis
(all refugees are migrants, but not all migrants are refugees), the underlying principle of the Church’s response is captured in its 2011 statement
on immigration policy, quoted in part here:
The bedrock moral issue for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints is how we treat each other as children of God.
The history of mass expulsion or mistreatment of individuals or
families is cause for concern especially where race, culture, or religion
are involved. This should give pause to any policy that contemplates
targeting any one group, particularly if that group comes mostly from
one heritage.
. . . The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is concerned
that any state legislation that only contains enforcement provisions is
likely to fall short of the high moral standard of treating each other as
children of God.

9. First Presidency to General Authorities and Others, March 26, 2016. The
full letter can be downloaded at iwasastranger.lds.org. It is worth noting that in
this letter the plight of refugees is equated with the plight of the poor. This association is made all the more potent given the relatively recent addition of “care
for the poor and needy” to the mission of the Church. See Peggy Fletcher Stack,
“New LDS Emphasis: Care for the Needy,” Salt Lake Tribune, December 9, 2009,
http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/lds/ci_13965607.
10. “Elder Holland Transcript: Religious Freedom and Preventing Sexual
Violence,” Newsroom—The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, September 11, 2016, http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/transcript-elder
-holland-religious-persecution-forced-migration-conference.
11. “Elder Holland Transcript: The Mormon Refugee Experience,” Newsroom—The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, September 12, 2016,
http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/elder-holland-transcript-mormon
-refugee-experience.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol57/iss1/4
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The Church supports an approach where undocumented immigrants are allowed to square themselves with the law and continue to
work without this necessarily leading to citizenship.
In furtherance of needed immigration reform in the United States,
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints supports a balanced
and civil approach to a challenging problem, fully consistent with its
tradition of compassion, its reverence for family, and its commitment
to law.12

Of course, some would be quick to point out the opening paragraph of the statement: “Most Americans agree that the federal government of the United States should secure its borders and sharply reduce
or eliminate the flow of undocumented immigrants. Unchecked and
unregulated, such a flow may destabilize society and ultimately become
unsustainable.” Furthermore, in a March 2011 announcement prior to
the official statement above, the Church “acknowledge[d] that every
nation has the right to enforce its laws and secure its borders. All persons subject to a nation’s laws are accountable for their acts in relation
to them.”13
While pinning down a specific immigration policy based on the
Church’s statements is nearly impossible, it is worth pointing out what
they do not say, namely, that immigration should be discouraged. The
official statement plainly states that most Americans support a reduction
in undocumented immigrants. The Church also encourages its members
to obey the law and refrain from “entering any country without legal
documentation” or “deliberately overstaying legal travel visas” as a matter of Church policy.14 This is in keeping with the twelfth Article of Faith:
“We believe . . . in obeying, honoring, and sustaining the law.”15 However, the flow of undocumented workers could technically be reduced
or eliminated by making legalization more accessible (that is, making
these illegal immigrants legal). In other words, the law could be changed
12. “Immigration: Church Issues New Statement,” Newsroom—The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, June 10, 2011, http://www.mormonnews
room.org/article/immigration-church-issues-new-statement.
13. “A Principle-Based Approach to Immigration,” Newsroom—The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, March 17, 2011, http://www.mormonnews
room.org/article/a-principle-based-approach-to-immigration.
14. “Immigration: Church Issues New Statement.”
15. “The Articles of Faith of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,”
Lds.org, https://www.lds.org/scriptures/pgp/a-of-f/1?lang=eng.
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and subsequently obeyed, honored, and sustained. The statement also
says “unchecked and unregulated” illegal immigration “may destabilize
society and ultimately become unsustainable.”16 This is an arguably wise
acknowledgement, but it is mainly a reflection of uncertainty, caution,
and intellectual humility. Ultimately, the question about the impact of
undocumented immigrants is an empirical one.
This more liberal position is a fairly recent development in the
Church. In 2004, Utah passed a bill prohibiting undocumented workers
from obtaining a driver’s license. The Church was reported as taking
“no position” on the bill and “warned” others “not to imply otherwise.”17
In 2006, journalist Lou Dobbs claimed that the LDS Church “has a
vigorous enthusiasm for as many of Mexico’s citizens as they possibly
could attract to the state of Utah, irrespective of the cost to taxpayers.”18
In response, the Church issued a statement, saying that Dobbs’s assertions were “completely without foundation. . . . The Church, in fact,
has made no comment so far on the immigration debate, recognizing
that this complex question is now before Congress and is already being
thoroughly aired in the public square.”19 Yet, in 2008, Elder Marlin K.
Jensen of the Seventy advocated for “a spirit of compassion” regarding immigration, reminding lawmakers, “Immigration questions are
questions dealing with God’s children. . . . I believe a more thoughtful
and factual, not to mention humane, approach is warranted, and urge
those responsible for enactment of Utah’s immigration policy to measure twice before they cut.”20
According to a 2012 news report, “Latinos now make up the fastest growing segment within the Church” in the United States. “From
2000 to 2010 the number of Spanish language congregations more than
16. “Immigration: Church Issues New Statement,” italics added.
17. Josh Loftin, “Immigrant Driver’s License Bill Expires,” Deseret News,
March 4, 2004, https://www.deseretnews.com/article/595046525/Immigrant
-drivers-license-bill-expires.html.
18. Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees Transcript, aired May 23, 2006, http://
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0605/23/acd.02.html.
19. “Response to Lou Dobbs Comments on CNN,” Newsroom—The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, May 23, 2006, https://www.mormonnews
room.org/article/the-church-and-immigration.
20. Deborah Bulkeley, “Have Compassion for Immigrants, Lawmakers Urged,”
Deseret News, February 14, 2008, https://www.deseretnews.com/article/695253048/
Have-compassion-for-immigrants-lawmakers-urged.html.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol57/iss1/4
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doubled from 377 to 760.”21 In 2009, BYU’s Ignacio Garcia estimated
that 70 percent of all Latino converts in the United States over the previous decade or more had been undocumented immigrants.22 It is likely
that this growth in membership among undocumented immigrants was
what drove the Church’s support of the Utah Compact, a statement of
principles signed by political, business, religious, and law enforcement
leaders. In the wake of Arizona’s 2010 enforcement bill on illegal immigration (which was authored by a member of the Church), Utah lawmakers sought to construct a similar bill. In response, Church leadership
praised the Utah Compact, describing it as “a responsible approach to
the urgent challenge of immigration reform.”23 The state declaration
highlighted law enforcement while opposing “policies that unnecessarily separate families.” The compact also “acknowledge[d] the economic
role immigrants play as workers and taxpayers.” Finally, it said, “We
must adopt a humane approach to [immigration], reflecting our unique
culture, history and spirit of inclusion. The way we treat immigrants will
say more about us as a free society and less about our immigrant neighbors. Utah should always be a place that welcomes people of goodwill.”24
In 2011, the Church released its official statement on immigration.
During the next few years, the federal government failed to enact
comprehensive immigration reform, and so it became a divisive political issue in the 2016 presidential campaign. In September 2017, President Trump announced that he would begin to phase out the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which protected
nearly 800,000 undocumented individuals who had entered the country as minors, by granting a two-year period of deferred action from

21. Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto, “Analysis: Latinos Are the Fastest Growing Group in the Mormon Church,” NBC Latino, February 13, 2012, http://
nbclatino.com/2012/02/13/17547041869/.
22. Daniel Gonzalez, “LDS Members Conflicted on Church’s IllegalMigrant Growth,” USA Today, April 3, 2009, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/religion/2009-04-03-mormon-immigrants_N.htm.
23. “Church Supports Principles of Utah Compact on Immigration,” Newsroom—The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, November 11, 2010,
http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/church-supports-principles-of
-utah-compact-on-immigration.
24. The Utah Compact: A Declaration of Five Principles to Guide Utah’s
Immigration Discussion, November 11, 2010, https://the-utah-compact.com/.
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deportation (subject to renewal) and eligibility for work authorization.25 Following the government shutdown in January 2018, the Trump
administration proposed an immigration plan that would grant legal
status to young immigrants brought over illegally as children, allow
them to work, and provide a possible path to citizenship over a ten-totwelve-year period. “In exchange,” reports the New York Times, “Congress would have to create a $25 billion trust fund to pay for a southern
border wall, dramatically increase immigration arrests, speed up deportations, crack down on people who overstay their visas, prevent citizens
from bringing their parents to the United States, and end a State Department program designed to encourage migration from underrepresented
countries. White House officials said that the list of enhanced security
measures . . . were nonnegotiable. They warned that if no deal is reached,
DACA recipients will face deportation when the program fully expires
on March 5.”26 With the threat of expiration looming near, the Church
released an official statement on DACA:
Immigration is a complex and sometimes divisive issue. . . . Each
nation must determine and administer its policies related to immigration. The Church does not advocate any specific legislative or executive solution. Our hope is that, in whatever solution emerges, there is
provision for strengthening families and keeping them together. We
also acknowledge that every nation has the right to enforce its laws
and secure its borders and that all persons subject to a nation’s laws are
accountable for their acts in relation to them.
We welcome the sincere efforts of lawmakers and leaders to seek
for solutions that honor these principles and extend compassion to
those seeking a better life. Specifically, we call upon our national leaders to create policies that provide hope and opportunities for those,
sometimes referred to as “Dreamers,” who grew up here from a young
25. See Michael D. Shear and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trump Moves to
End DACA and Calls on Congress to Act,” New York Times, September 5, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers-immi
gration.html; Tal Kopan, “Trump Ends DACA but Gives Congress Window to
Save It,” CNN, September 5, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/05/politics/
daca-trump-congress/index.html; “Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred
Action For Childhood Arrivals (DACA),” September, 5, 2017; https://www.dhs
.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca.
26. Michael D. Shear and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Trump Immigration Plan
Demands Tough Concessions from Democrats,” New York Times, January 25,
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/us/politics/trump-immigration
-plan-white-house.html.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol57/iss1/4
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age and for whom this country is their home. They have built lives,
pursued educational opportunities and been employed for years based
on the policies that were in place. These individuals have demonstrated
a capacity to serve and contribute positively in our society, and we
believe they should be granted the opportunity to continue to do so.27

The Church’s position on immigration has evolved over time in
response to the polarized political climate surrounding the issue. When
all the Church’s statements are considered, it becomes fairly clear that
the Church’s position over the last several years has leaned (somewhat
tentatively) in favor of more open and inclusive immigration policies.
This is likely due to the Church’s own history, the narratives of its scriptural canon, and its theological and moral commitments.
Migration in Scripture and Sacred History
The story of migration is the story of humanity and consequently the
story of scripture. Beginning with the exile of Adam and Eve from the
Garden of Eden to the establishment of the Enochic Zion to modern
times, God’s covenant people have always been migrants of one sort or
another. God’s promise to make Abraham “a great nation” (Gen. 12:2)28
is intertwined with the command to “get thee out of thy country . . .
unto a land that I will shew thee” (Gen. 12:1; compare Abr. 2:3). As
outlined by Donald Senior of Catholic Theological Union, “the deepest
experiences of Israel are marked by migration.” These include “the tortured journey of Jacob and his sons to Egypt in search of food in a time
of famine,” “the defining experience of the Exodus,” the “deportation of
the northern tribes by Assyria in the seventh century,” “the Babylonian
exile a century or more later,” and the “subsequent mass dispersions
under the Greeks and Romans.” Senior further notes, “These markers
in the biblical saga—the wanderings of the patriarchs, the Exodus, the
exile, the dispersion, and the return—became embedded in the consciousness of the people of Israel and helped define their character as a
people and the nature of their relationship to God.”29
27. “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Statement,” Newsroom—The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, January 26, 2018, https://
www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/daca-statement-january-2018.
28. Unless noted otherwise, all Bible references herein are from the King
James Version.
29. Donald Senior, “‘Beloved Aliens and Exiles’: New Testament Perspectives on Migration,” in A Promised Land, a Perilous Journey: Theological
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2018
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Migration also plays a role in the New Testament. The story of Christ’s
birth in both Luke and Matthew portray Jesus as being “born on the
road, as it were,” as Mary and Joseph returned “to their ancestral home
for a census imposed by a world ruler (Luke 2:1–7).”30 As mentioned
by Elder Kearon, Matthew’s Gospel features Mary and Joseph fleeing
to Egypt to escape the genocide enacted by King Herod (Matt. 2:13–23)
and eventually settling in Nazareth to avoid the cruelty of Herod’s son
Archelaus (Matt. 2:22–23). Persecution scattered the early Christian
communities throughout Judea and Samaria (Acts 8:1–8) and later to
Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Antioch (Acts 11:19–21). In Acts 18, Paul meets
Aquila and Priscilla in Corinth, who had been displaced from Rome due
to Claudius’s edict. Apostolic letters also mention the exiled status of the
early Christians. The author of 1 Peter addresses the recipients as “foreigners and exiles” (1 Pet. 2:11, NET31), while James addresses his epistle
to “the twelve tribes in the Dispersion” (James 1:1, NRSV32). Senior notes,
“Some contemporary commentators . . . believe the designation as resident aliens and exiles is not simply used as a spiritual metaphor but is an
indication of the social and ethnic status of these Christians as migrant
workers who were socially and ethnically estranged to these regions as
well as experiencing spiritual isolation and harassment because of their
Christian allegiance.”33
The Book of Mormon also contains stories of migration. The book
opens with details of the departure of Lehi and his family from Jerusalem to the New World (1 Ne. 2, 7, 17–18), echoing the Exodus of ancient
Israel.34 The book of Ether details the migration of the Jaredites from
Babel to the promised land (Ether 1–3, 6). One record of this people
was discovered later by King Mosiah1 among the people of Zarahemla
(Omni 1:20–21), and another was discovered by the people of Limhi
(Mosiah 8:6–17). The “people of Zarahemla” were themselves migrants,
Perspectives on Migration, ed. Daniel G. Groody and Gioacchino Campese
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 21–22.
30. Senior, “Beloved Aliens and Exiles,” 23.
31. New English Translation.
32. New Revised Standard Version.
33. Senior, “Beloved Aliens and Exiles,” 25.
34. See George S. Tate, “The Typology of the Exodus Pattern in the Book
of Mormon,” in Literature of Belief: Sacred Scripture and Religious Experience,
ed. Neal E. Lambert (Provo, Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center, 1981); S. Kent
Brown, “The Exodus Pattern in the Book of Mormon,” BYU Studies 30, no. 3
(1990): 111–26.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol57/iss1/4
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tracing their lineage back to Zedekiah’s son Mulek, who escaped Jerusalem prior to the Babylonian exile (Omni 1:15–16; Hel. 6:10, 8:21). Other
massive migrations are mentioned throughout the Book of Mormon,
including:
• King Mosiah and his people’s inspired departure to the land of
Zarahemla (Omni 1:12–13).
• Zeniff ’s expedition to recolonize the land of Nephi (Omni 1:27–30).
• The integration of the people of Ammon into Nephite society
(Alma 43:11–13).
• The thousands who “departed out of the land of Zarahemla into
the land which was northward” (Alma 63:4).
• Hagoth and those that followed him (Alma 63:5–7).35
• The “exceedingly great many” that departed “out of the land of
Zarahemla, and went forth unto the land northward to inherit the
land” and “did spread forth into all parts of the land” (Hel. 3:3, 5).
• The free trade and mobility among the Nephites and Lamanites
during and following the sixty-third year, from which both grew
“exceedingly rich” (Hel. 6:6–9).
Early Mormon history and revelations were also in large part driven
by migration, with the early Saints moving from place to place, seeking refuge from persecution. Their multiple interstate migrations are
well known—from New York to Ohio to Missouri to Illinois to their
eventual settlement in what was then Mexican territory (later Utah).
“After the Mormon exodus to the Great Basin,” writes Nathan B. Oman,
“Americans came to see Mormons—the majority of whom were either
displaced Yankees or converts from Northern Europe—as a foreign
race.”36 This mounting distrust and suspicion toward Mormons and

35. See Robert E. Parsons, “Hagoth and the Polynesians,” in The Book of
Mormon: Alma, the Testimony of the Word, ed. Monte S. Nyman and Charles D.
Tate Jr. (Provo, Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center, 1992), 249–62.
36. Nathan B. Oman, “Natural Law and the Rhetoric of Empire: Reynolds v.
United States, Polygamy, and Imperialism,” Washington University Law Review
88, no. 3 (2011): 681. See also W. Paul Reeve, Religion of a Different Color: Race
and the Mormon Struggle for Whiteness (New York: Oxford University Press,
2015); J. Spencer Fluhman, “A Peculiar People”: Anti-Mormonism and the Making of Religion in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2012).
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2018
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their “uncivilized”37 practice of polygamy influenced American immigration debates of that time.
In a 2017 brief filed in the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding President Trump’s barring of refugees and immigrants
from various Muslim countries,38 nineteen Mormon scholars outlined
the history of governmental hostility toward Mormons, including the
targeting of Mormon immigrants. “In 1879,” they write, “the Secretary
of State sent a circular letter to all American diplomatic offices, calling
on them to pressure European governments to prohibit Mormon emigration from their countries. The letter denounced Mormon converts
as coming from among the ‘ignorant classes’ and insisted that Mormon missionary efforts were a ‘criminal enterprise.’ It called on European governments to make sure that the United States did not become
‘a resort or refuge for . . . crowds of misguided men and women.’ ”39 The
US government also attempted to turn away Mormon converts at ports
of entry, even blocking Mormons emigrating from England to New
York City.40
As this brief overview demonstrates, God’s covenant people were
often migrants themselves, typically due to persecution, war, or disasters. In fact, it wasn’t until the presidency of David O. McKay in the latter half of the twentieth century that the expectation for non-American
converts to emigrate to the Great Basin was officially reversed.41 As
recent events have revealed, it can be easy to assume the worst about
37. Chief Justice Morrison Waite “situate[d] polygamists among the ‘uncivilized.’ ” “Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western
nations of Europe,” Waite opined, “and, until the establishment of the Mormon
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African
people.” Fluhman, “Peculiar People,” 110.
38. Early Mormons were often compared to Muslims and Joseph Smith to
Muhammad. See Fluhman, “‘Imposter’: The Mormon Prophet,” ch. 1 in “Peculiar People”; Reeves, “Oriental, White, and Mormon,” ch. 8 in Religion of a Different Color.
39. Amici Curiae Brief of Scholars of American Religious History and Law
in Support of Neither Party, State of Hawaii, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al.,
15–16, scholarship.law.wm.edu/briefs/6/.
40. Amici Curiae Brief of Scholars, 15–16.
41. See Gregory A. Prince and Wm. Robert Wright, David O. McKay and
the Rise of Modern Mormonism (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005),
363–67. Church leaders in the early twentieth century neither encouraged nor
discouraged emigration.
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migrants from a comfortable, settled position. However, the scriptures
and Mormons’ own history should disturb any negative, simplistic ideas
one might have about migrants.
Strangers, the Sin of Sodom, and Zion
One of the most prominent and consistent themes throughout the LDS
canon is an obligation to care for the poor and needy.42 Included among
the list of the disadvantaged classes in need of provisions and protection—widows, orphans, and the poor—were “strangers” or “sojourners”
(Deut. 24:17–21; Jer. 7:6; Zech. 7:10).43 As stated in the Dictionary of the
42. In Enoch’s time, “the Lord called his people Zion, because they were of
one heart and one mind, and dwelt in righteousness; and there was no poor
among them” (Moses 7:18). Modern revelation commanded the early Saints
to “remember the poor, and consecrate of thy properties for their support that
which thou hast to impart unto them, with a covenant and a deed which cannot
be broken” (D&C 42:30). The Book of Mormon—and King Benjamin in particular—places special emphasis on the poor and needy: “administer of your
substance unto him that standeth in need; and ye will not suffer that the beggar
putteth up his petition to you in vain, and turn him out to perish” (Mosiah 4:16).
The post-Christ Nephite Zion “had all things common among them; therefore
there were not rich and poor, bond and free” (4 Ne. 1:3). The law of Moses had
rules in place to make sure the poor were provided for (Ex. 21:2–6; 22:25–27;
23:10–11; Lev. 19:9–10; 25:3–7, 25–27; Deut. 14:28–29; 15:12–15; 24:19–21; 26:12–13).
The prophets consistently reminded Israel and its rulers of their obligations to
the poor (Isa. 10:1–4; Amos 2:6–7; 4:1; Ezek. 18). Oppressors of the poor were
considered wicked (Ps. 37:14; Prov. 14:31), and God himself would provide for
and protect the poor (Isa. 41:17; Ps. 140:12). The prophetic concern for the economically disadvantaged continued with the ministry of Jesus, who declared
his mission to involve “preach[ing] the gospel to the poor” (Luke 4:18). Christ
taught that to feed the hungry and thirsty, clothe the naked, visit the sick and
imprisoned, and host the stranger—“the least of these”—was to do so unto him
(Matt. 25:35–40). In Jesus’s view, the one thing the rich man lacked was to “sell
whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, take up the cross, and
follow me” (Mark 10:21). The Christian charge to care for the poor continued
in the early Christian communities, with Paul seeking a collection for the poor
of the Jerusalem church (Gal. 2:1–10; 1 Cor. 16:1–4; Rom. 15:25–27). See also
David J. Cherrington, “Poverty, Attitudes Toward,” in Encyclopedia of Mormonism, ed. Daniel H. Ludlow, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1992); Michael D.
Coogan, “Poor,” in The Oxford Companion to the Bible, ed. Bruce M. Metzger
and Michael D. Coogan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 604.
43. See Timothy M. Willis, “Alien,” in Metzger and Coogan, Oxford Companion to the Bible, 120.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2018

13

78

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4

v BYU Studies Quarterly

Old Testament, “The position of the ‘alien’ in ancient Near Eastern society
was generally one of dependence, with a certain amount of cultural isolation.” Given Israel’s experiences listed above, the identity of the stranger
was “foundational to Israelite self-understanding.”44 Hence, the Lord
commanded Israel, “Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him:
for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt” (Ex. 22:21). The alien resident
among the Israelites was to “be unto you as one born among you, and
thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt:
I am the Lord your God” (Lev. 19:34). The stranger was therefore protected under Israelite law due to their vulnerable position (Deut. 1:16–17;
16:11, 14; 24:14, 17–18; 26:12–13; 27:19; Lev. 19:10; 23:22; 25:6).45
Mistreatment of the stranger seeking refuge was likely the reason
for the destruction of Sodom. Hospitality was “one of the most highly
praised virtues in antiquity. In nomadic societies, hospitality was an
unwritten law, and the stranger was regarded as divinely protected.”46
When the “men of Sodom” demanded that Lot give up his angelic/holy
guests47 so that they might “know” them (Gen. 19:4–5)—in contrast
to Abraham’s reaction (Gen. 18)—they committed “a gross violation of
the conventions of hospitality.”48 As biblical scholar Gordon Wenham
explains, “In the ancient Near East outside Israel (cf. Lev. 18:22) homosexual acts between consenting adults do not seem to have been banned,
but homosexual rape was, except to humiliate prisoners of war. Everywhere it would have been regarded as abhorrent to treat guests this way;
rather, there was a sacred duty to look after them.”49 It becomes apparent that the sin of Sodom had to do with “social injustice—mistreatment of the powerless. Among the latter were strangers, and the story
of Lot in Genesis 19 provides a vivid illustration of how strangers were

44. R. J. D. Knauth, “Alien, Foreign Resident,” in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch, ed. T. Desmond Alexander and David W. Baker (Downers
Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 26.
45. Knauth, “Alien, Foreign Resident,” 32–33.
46. Abraham J. Malherbe, “Hospitality,” in Metzger and Coogan, Oxford
Companion to the Bible, 292.
47. The King James text describes the men as “angels,” but the Joseph Smith
Translation of Genesis 18:22 reads, “And the angels which were holy men . . .”
48. Jon Levenson, “Genesis,” in The Jewish Study Bible, ed. Adele Berlin and
Marc Zvi Brettler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 41.
49. Gordon J. Wenham, “Genesis,” in Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible,
ed. James D. G. Dunn and John W. Rogerson (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans,
2003), 53.
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mistreated in Sodom, by being subject to rape. Homoeroticism is only
secondarily relevant.”50 Or, as Ezekiel preached, “Behold, this was the
iniquity of thy sister Sodom, pride, fullness of bread, and abundance of
idleness was in her and in her daughters, neither did she strengthen the
hand of the poor and needy” (Ezek. 16:49).51
The welcoming of the ethnically and culturally different is later
encapsulated in Paul’s mission to the Gentiles: “There is neither Jew nor
Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female:
for ye are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28). The author of Ephesians
echoes this communal embrace of Gentile converts: “Now therefore ye
are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellowcitizens with the saints,
and of the household of God” (Eph. 2:19).
Interestingly enough, migration and refuge were also inherent in the
early Mormon conception of Zion (see D&C 45:64–71; 115:5–6). Mark
Ashurst-McGee, historian and editor for the Joseph Smith Papers Project, explains that “[Joseph] Smith’s eschatology . . . established another
dynamic geopolitical relationship between Zion and the nations: Zion
would be a refugee territory in the midst of a world of warring nations.”
He continues:
As the plague of international conflict spread, Zion would serve as a
neutral territory and safe harbor for any wishing to escape the destructions of war. . . . At this extreme moment of worldwide conflict, Smith
declared, “every man that will not take his sword against his neighbor
must needs flee unto Zion for safety & there shall be gathered unto it out
of every nation under heaven” (D&C 45:68–69). . . . Smith’s prophecy of
civil and global war traced the trajectory of destruction to its extremity—the “full end of all Nations” (D&C 87:6). . . . After the destruction
of the United States and all other nations, Zion would be left standing
as the sole sovereign in the Americas. . . . These revelations gave the
Saints a view of the world as a place that was contentious and prone to
violence, warfare, and destruction. . . . Zion would serve as a refuge only
for the peaceful.52
50. Michael Coogan, God and Sex: What the Bible Really Says (New York:
Twelve, 2010), 130.
51. John J. Goldingay explains, “Given Ezekiel’s sexual imagery, it is noteworthy that Sodom’s sin lies in its combination of good living with social neglect
(v. 49), in line with the implications of Genesis 18 itself, not in the sexual practices which have preoccupied the Christian postbiblical tradition.” Goldingay,
“Ezekiel,” in Dunn and Rogerson, Eerdmans Commentary on the Bible, 637.
52. Mark Ashurst-McGee, “Zion as a Refuge from the Wars of Nations,”
in War and Peace in Our Time: Mormon Perspectives, ed. Patrick Q. Mason,
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Public Opinion on Immigration
Given the scriptural, moral, and theological commitments to the
stranger detailed above, it is important to establish what the average
person thinks about immigration. According to a 2015 study, which
surveyed 183,000 adults in more than 140 countries from 2012 to 2014,
only 21 percent of the world population would like to see an increase
in immigration.53 More specifically, only 23 percent of North Americans support increasing immigration, while a mere 8 percent of Europeans do (52 percent want to decrease it). The number of Americans
in favor of increased immigration has steadily risen from 7 percent in
1965 to 21 percent in 2016. Those wanting to decrease immigration has
dropped from 65 percent in 1993 to 38 percent in 2016.54 Worry over
illegal immigration is split along party lines in the United States: 79 percent of Republicans worry “a great deal or fair amount” over illegal
immigration, while 48 percent of Democrats and 57 percent of Independents do.55 Despite this partisan difference, an increasing number in
both major parties recognize that “immigrants strengthen the country
because of their hard work and talents.”56
A particularly interesting aspect of public attitudes toward immigration is that of political ignorance. Multiple studies have shown that

J. David Pulsipher, and Richard L. Bushman (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford
Books, 2012), 87–89.
53. Neli Esipova and others, How the World Views Migration (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2015), https://publications
.iom.int/system/files/how_the_world_gallup.pdf.
54. “Immigration,” Gallup News, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immi
gration.aspx. See also Lee Rainie and Anna Brown, “Americans Less Concerned Than a Decade Ago over Immigrants’ Impact on Workforce,” Pew
Research Center: Fact Tank, October 7, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact
-tank/2016/10/07/americans-less-concerned-than-a-decade-ago-over-immi
grants-impact-on-workforce/.
55. Jeffrey M. Jones, “In US, Worry about Illegal Immigration Steady,” Gallup, March 20, 2017, http://www.gallup.com/poll/206681/worry-illegal-immi
gration-steady.aspx.
56. The portion of Republicans who express this view grew from 30 percent in 1994 to 42 percent in 2017, while the number of Democrats went from
32 percent to 84 percent. “More Say Immigrants Strengthen U.S. as the Partisan
Divide Grows,” Pew Research Center, October 4, 2017, http://www.people-press
.org/2017/10/05/4-race-immigration-and-discrimination/4_9-3/.
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political ignorance is rampant among average voters,57 and this holds
true when it comes to immigration policy. As legal scholar Ilya Somin
explains, “Immigration restriction . . . is one that has long-standing associations with political ignorance. In both the United States and Europe,
survey data suggest that it is strongly correlated with overestimation
of the proportion of immigrants in the population, lack of sophistication in making judgments about the economic costs and benefits of
immigration, and general xenophobic attitudes toward foreigners. By
contrast, studies show that there is little correlation between opposition to immigration and exposure to labor market competition from
recent immigrants.”58 One pair of economists found that those voting
to leave the European Union in the Brexit referendum, who were motivated largely by a desire to restrict immigration, “were overwhelmingly
more likely to live in areas with very low levels of migration.”59 Similarly,
57. See Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter, 2d ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2016);
Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad
Policies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); Christopher H.
Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not
Produce Responsive Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2016); and Jason Brennan, “Ignorant, Irrational, Misinformed Nationalists,”
ch. 2 in Against Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016).
For an analysis of the public disdain for experts, see Tom Nichols, The Death
of Expertise: The Campaign against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
58. Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance, 23. See also Jens Hainmueller and Daniel J. Hopkins, “Public Attitudes towards Immigration,” Annual
Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 225–49. Somin makes clear that “political
ignorance is not the result of stupidity or selfishness. . . . The insignificance
of any one vote to electoral outcomes makes it rational for most citizens to
devote little effort acquiring political knowledge. They also have little incentive to engage in unbiased evaluation of the information they do know.” Somin,
Democracy and Political Ignorance, 3–4.
59. Chris Lawton and Robert Ackrill, “Hard Evidence: How Areas with Low
Immigration Voted Mainly for Brexit,” The Conversation, July 8, 2016, https://
theconversation.com/hard-evidence-how-areas-with-low-immigration-voted
-mainly-for-brexit-62138. However, in these areas the foreign-born population
had recently increased dramatically, even if the overall head count of immigrants was comparatively low. See “Britain’s Immigration Paradox,” The Economist, July 8, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21701950-areas-lots
-migrants-voted-mainly-remain-or-did-they-britains-immigration-paradox.
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v oters who supported Donald Trump during the US election were more
likely to oppose liberalizing immigration laws (even compared to other
Republicans), but least likely to live in racially diverse neighborhoods.60
In short, both political ignorance and lack of interaction with foreigners tend to inflame anti-immigration sentiments. These sentiments are
what George Mason University economist Bryan Caplan refers to as
antiforeign bias: “a tendency to underestimate the economic benefits of
interaction with foreigners.”61 In fact, economists take nearly the opposite view from the general public on immigration.62
Where do most Mormons fall along the spectrum of immigration
attitudes? According to political scientists David Campbell, Christopher
Karpowitz, and J. Quin Monson, American Mormons “are more accepting of immigrants than most other Americans, particularly in contrast
to evangelicals. The Faith Matters survey (2011) gave respondents the
option of saying that immigration should be increased, decreased, or
kept the same as it is.” According to one analysis of the survey, it turns
out that
26 percent of Mormons would like to see more immigration. That may
not seem like a lot until Mormons are compared with other religious
traditions. Only Jews are more likely to favor greater immigration
(29 percent). By contrast, only 12 percent of evangelicals favor more
immigration. Likewise, Mormons are also on the low end of favoring
less immigration—only Jews are less likely to say that America should
decrease the number of new arrivals in the country.
. . . The church’s own policy is to turn a blind eye toward people
who are in the United States illegally—the church will baptize them, call
them on missions, and even have them serve as church leaders. LDS
leaders have consistently been a voice of compassion regarding immigration. A notable example is the message of emeritus church general
authority Elder Marlin Jensen, who has urged lawmakers to consider
illegal immigrants as “God’s children” and to “slow down, step back and
carefully study and assess the implications and human costs involved”
in legislation designed to curb illegal immigration. More recently, the
church has taken a vocal stand for moderate immigration reforms
that balance a law-and-order mentality against compassion for immigrants and a strong desire for policies that keep families together. These

60. Jonathan T. Rothwell and Pablo Diego-Rosell, “Explaining Nationalist
Political Views: The Case of Donald Trump,” November 2, 2016, 11–14; SSRN:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2822059.
61. Caplan, Myth of the Rational Voter, 36.
62. Caplan, Myth of the Rational Voter, 58–59.
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stances moved public opinion among conservative Utah Mormons in a
more moderate direction.63

Thankfully, a 2016 study found that accurate information can actually
shift people’s views on immigration.64 The goal of the remainder of this
paper is to present some of the most up-to-date scholarship on immigration economics in hopes of shifting the views of Latter-day Saints
who are either on the fence or skeptical about immigration. By receiving
accurate information and empirical evidence, Latter-day Saints can better engage the topic and improve the lives of their brothers and sisters
around the world.
The Economy as a Whole
The positive economic impact of immigrants—past, present, and potential future—is often underappreciated in the debate over immigration.
During America’s Age of Mass Migration (1850–1920), the United States
witnessed its highest levels of immigration. In contrast to previous
waves of mainly western-European immigrants, this period saw large
numbers of immigrants from southern, northern, and eastern Europe.
They brought with them both different languages and different religious
practices. A working paper from the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) finds that US counties that experienced more immigrant settlement during this time period “now have higher incomes, less
unemployment, less poverty, more education, and more urbanization.”
The authors also found that “these economic benefits do not come at
the cost of social outcomes.” Furthermore, “immigrants resulted in an
immediate increase in industrialization. Immigrants first contributed
to the establishment of more manufacturing facilities and then to the
development of larger facilities.” Immigrants also had “large positive
effects . . . on agricultural productivity and innovation as measured by
patenting rates.”65
63. David E. Campbell, Christopher F. Karpowitz, and J. Quin Monson,
“A Politically Peculiar People: How Mormons Moved into and Then out of
the Political Mainstream,” in Mormonism and American Politics, ed. Randall
Balmer and Jana Riess (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 146–47.
64. Alexis Grigorieff, Christopher Roth, and Diego Ubfal, “Does Information Change Attitudes towards Immigrants? Representative Evidence from
Survey Experiments,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 10419, December 2016, http://
ftp.iza.org/dp10419.pdf.
65. Sandra Sequeira, Nathan Nunn, and Nancy Qian, “Migrants and the
Making of America: The Short and Long-Run Effects of Immigration during
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This trend of positive economic impact from immigration continues
today. In 2015, migrants made up 3.4 percent of the world population yet
contributed about $6.7 trillion to global output—9.4 percent of world
gross domestic product (GDP).66 Even those working illegally in the
United States contribute about 3 percent of private-sector GDP annually—around five trillion dollars over a ten-year period. Granting these
migrants legal status would increase the percentage to 3.6.67 In France,
an increase of foreign-born workers in a firm’s department increases
the productivity of that department, especially for firms with virtually no previous foreign employment.68 A 2016 International Monetary
Fund (IMF) study estimates that—after controlling for multiple variables, including trade openness, technology, education level, and age
structure—“a 1 percentage point increase in the share of migrants in the
adult population (the average annual increase is 0.2 percentage point)
can raise GDP per capita by up to 2 percent in the longer run.”69 More
the Age of Mass Migration,” NBER Working Paper No. 23289, 2017, 43–44,
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/immigrants_in_america_manu
script.pdf.
66. Jonathan Woetzel and others, People on the Move: Global Migration’s
Impact and Opportunity (McKinsey Global Institute, December 2016), 1, 8, 55,
http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/global
-migrations-impact-and-opportunity. Gross domestic product is “a measure of
the value of all of the goods and services produced in a country or equivalently
as the total income, in the form of wages, rents, interest, and profits, earned
in a country. GDP is thus also known as output or national income.” It works
as “a rough-and-ready measure of standard of living.” David N. Weil, Economic
Growth, 3d ed. (New York: Pearson Education, 2013), 3.
67. Ryan Edwards and Francesc Ortega, “The Economic Contribution of
Unauthorized Workers: An Industry Analysis,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 10366,
November 2016, http://ftp.iza.org/dp10366.pdf. Legal authorization has also
been shown to reduce unemployment and poverty among undocumented
immigrants as well as increase the income for immigrants at the bottom of
the income distribution. See Catalina Ameudo-Dorantes, “Can Authorization Reduce Poverty among Undocumented Immigrants? Evidence from the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program,” Economic Letters 147 (2016):
1–4; Nolan G. Pope, “The Effects of DACAmentation: The Impact of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals on Unauthorized Immigrants,” Journal of Public
Economics 143 (2016): 98–144.
68. Cristina Mitaritonna, Gianluca Orefice, and Giovanni Peri, “Immigrants
and Firms’ Outcomes: Evidence from France,” European Economic Review 96
(2017): 62–82.
69. Florence Jaumotte, Ksenia Koloskova, and Sweta C. Saxena, “Impact
of Migration on Income Levels in Advanced Economies,” IMF Spillover
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol57/iss1/4
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importantly, it turns out that “migration increases income per capita for
both the top 10 and bottom 90 percent earners, even though the gain
is larger for the richest decile.”70 Even the most pessimistic literature
“estimates that immigration to the United States generates an annual
efficiency gain for Americans of between $5 billion and $10 billion.”71
These data represent both past and present effects of immigration.
But what if all current immigration restrictions around the world were
dropped? What would the future economy potentially look like? In a
2011 meta-analysis, economist Michael Clemens asked this very question. He found that the estimated “gains from eliminating migration
barriers dwarf—by an order of a magnitude or two—the gains from
eliminating other types of barriers. For the elimination of trade policy
barriers and capital flow barriers, the estimated gains amount to less
than a few percent of world GDP. For labor mobility barriers, the estimated gains are often in the range of 50–150 percent of world GDP.”72
These economic gains are astronomical; a literal doubling of world
product. But these gains assume the migration of over half the population of poor countries. However, even smaller movements (less than
5 percent of the population of poor countries) would result in “gains
exceeding the gains from total elimination of all policy barriers to merchandise trade and all barriers to capital flows.”73 A more recent analysis
finds that lifting all migration restrictions would increase world output
by 126 percent, while even partial liberalization (in which 10 percent of
the world population moves) would yield a nearly 14 percent increase
in world output.74

Notes, no. 8 (October 2016): 2, 11, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Spill
over-Notes/Issues/2016/12/31/Impact-of-Migration-on-Income-Levels-in
-Advanced-Economies-44343.
70. Jaumotte, Koloskova, and Saxena, “Impact of Migration on Income
Levels,” 15.
71. Peter T. Leeson and Zachary Gochenour, “The Economic Effects of
International Labor Mobility,” in The Economics of Immigration: Market-Based
Approaches, Social Science, and Public Policy, ed. Benjamin Powell (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 21.
72. Michael A. Clemens, “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar
Bills on the Sidewalk?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25 (Summer 2011): 84,
emphasis added.
73. Clemens, “Economics and Emigration,” 84.
74. Klaus Desmet, David Krisztian Nagy, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg,
“The Geography of Development,” Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming,
https://doi.org/10.1086/697084, see table 3.
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Restrictions on immigration are essentially restrictions on the selling of labor. One pair of political philosophers describes closed borders as a “type of trade restriction in labor, akin to an import quota or
restriction in cars, wheat, or other goods. Normally, such restrictions
lead to inefficiencies and deadweight losses, as they prevent mutually
beneficial trades from occurring, and cause people to turn to less productive providers.”75 Hence, the best economic evidence available suggests that liberalized immigration would be a gigantic gain to the world
economy, and a more prosperous economy often translates into greater
well-being.76 If one is concerned about potential problems of increased
immigration, a cost-benefit analysis must be in order. It is difficult to
imagine what problems could arise whose avoidance would be worth
sacrificing a whole earth’s worth of economic output.
Global Poverty
Immigration restrictions tend to negatively affect the least well-off. As a
case in point, annual legal immigration to the United States falls under
one of the the following categories: family-based immigration, temporary work visas, permanent employment visas, refugee visas, and diversity visas.77 The majority of US-bound immigrants are allowed into the
country based on family connections or work visas. As a result, those
without a college degree or a close family member in the country have
effectively no legal way to come to the United States. This makes the
common talking point “I’m in favor of immigration, just legal immigration” both tone deaf and misconstrued. The argument assumes the status quo is just and fair, ignoring the perverse incentives it creates among
those desperate for a better life but lacking the necessary “qualifications.”
As will be shown, immigration restrictions prevent the poor from seeking out better opportunities and instead force them—with the threat
of governmental violence—to remain in their impoverished or chaotic
homelands.

75. Jason Brennan and Bas van der Vossen, In Defense of Openness (New
York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
76. Two useful sources for comparing wealth and other factors of wellbeing are https://ourworldindata.org/ and http://www.gapminder.org/.
77. American Immigration Council, How the United States Immigration
System Works, August 12, 2016, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
research/how-united-states-immigration-system-works.
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The massive gains that immigration brings to the poor and needy
is captured in the work of Harvard’s Lant Pritchett, who compares the
effectiveness of antipoverty programs to that of migration. Pritchett and
colleagues compare the gains of migration to that of microcredit (made
famous by Muhammad Yunus, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
for his work),78 antisweatshop activism, additional schooling, and even
deworming. According to Pritchett, a low-skill Bangladeshi male “would
have to work four weeks in the United States to have a gain in income
equal to a lifetime of microcredit. . . . Obviously, one would have to
add a few weeks to pay transportation costs and some for expenditures
while in the United States, but a single seasonal access of three months
to a job in the United States could provide savings more than equal to
the total lifetime financial gain from microcredit.”79 A marginal worker
from Indonesia would have to work thirty weeks in the United States to
achieve the gain of a lifetime’s worth of antisweatshop activism. A similar worker from Bolivia would need only eleven weeks of work in the
United States to reach the lifetime benefit of an additional year of schooling at zero cost. Finally, a Kenyan worker would need only 0.3 weeks in
the US to achieve a lifetime’s earnings due to deworming.80 As Pritchett
asked elsewhere, “If I get 3,000 additional Bangladeshi workers into the
US, do I get a Nobel Peace Prize?”81
Further research by Pritchett and Clemens found that 82 percent
of native-born Haitians who are not now poor escaped poverty simply
by moving to and working in the United States. The percentages were
lower for Mexicans (43 percent) and Indians (27 percent) but are still
hefty amounts.82 This is even true for immigrants doing the same job
78. Microcredit is the lending of small amounts of money to businesses
in developing countries. See Muhammad Yunus, “Microlending: Toward a
Poverty-Free World,” BYU Studies 38, no. 2 (1999): 149–55; and “Muhammad
Yunus—Nobel Lecture” (lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2006), https://www.nobel
prize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-lecture-en.html.
79. Lant Pritchett, “The Cliff at the Border,” in Equity and Growth in a Globalizing World, ed. Ravi Kanbur and Michael Spence (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2010), 275.
80. Pritchett, “Cliff at the Border,” 275–76.
81. Lant Pritchett, “Is Migration Good for Development? How Could You
Even Ask?” (PowerPoint presentation, Columbia University, New York City,
February 13, 2009), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/lpritch/Presentations/Is
%20Migration%20Good%20for%20Development_columbia.ppt.
82. Michael A. Clemens and Lant Pritchett, “Income per Natural: Measuring Development for People Rather Than Places,” Population and Development
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requiring the same skill set as what they were doing in their native countries. For example, an “identical prime-age urban formal-sector male
Peruvian with nine years of Peruvian schooling earns about 2.6 times as
much in the US as in Peru.”83 For Filipinos, the estimated increase is 3.5,
while it is a colossal 7.8 for Haitians. But even these figures underestimate the full impact of migration for the poor. Remittances, for instance,
boost the income of families left behind in source countries. One analysis of remittances to Sri Lanka found that the majority of remittances
go to families in the bottom quintiles and positively impact the health
and education of recipient children.84 Remittances make up a significant portion of GDP for several countries, including the Kyrgyz Republic (34.5 percent), Nepal (29.7 percent), Liberia (29.6 percent), Haiti
(27.8 percent), and Tonga (27.8 percent).85 In 2013, they accounted for
nearly half of Tajikistan’s GDP.86 A review of the empirical literature
also finds that there is a robust, positive relationship between emigration and source-country wages, in part due to emigration’s reduction of
the labor supply in source countries.87 Even the status quo of skill-based
immigration “has offsetting benefits for those left behind. Skilled immigrants often return with valuable skills, investment capital, and business
connections. Furthermore, opportunities for high-skilled emigration
spur skill acquisition. Empirically, such incentives look strong enough
Review 34 (September 2008): 395–434.
83. Michael A. Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett, “The
Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. Border,” Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 148, December 2008,
4, https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/16352_file_CMP_place_premium
_148.pdf.
84. Prabal K. De and Dilip Ratha, “Impact of Remittances on Household
Income, Asset, and Human Capital: Evidence from Sri Lanka,” Migration and
Development 1 (June 2012): 163–79.
85. The World Bank Group, “Migration and remittances,” Migration and
Development Brief 27, April 2017, 3, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/99237149
2706371662/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief27.pdf.
86. The World Bank Group, “Migration and Remittances,” Migration and
Development Brief 24, April 13, 2015, 5, https://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationandDevelop
mentBrief24.pdf.
87. Prachi Mishra, “Emigration and Wages in Source Countries: A Survey
of the Empirical Literature,” in International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development, ed. Robert E. B. Lucas (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar,
2014), 241–66.
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to make the average non-migrant more skillful.”88 Complementing Clemens’s work mentioned in the previous section, economist John Kennan finds that dropping all immigration restrictions would lead to an
estimated net gain of “$10,798 per worker (including nonmigrants), per
year (in 2012 dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity). This is a
very large number: the average income per worker in these countries is
$8633, so the gain in (net) income is 125%.”89 This is a literal doubling of
income for the world’s most deprived.
When one reviews the vast improvements that immigration can
bring to the lives of the world’s poor, it becomes increasingly clear that
we have a moral obligation to echo the title of Lant Prichett’s book: let
their people come.90
Refugees
It is plausible the forced migration of refugees would result in a different
scenario than that of self-selected immigration, resulting in an economic
burden rather than gain. However, the evidence is once again against this
common assumption. A 2016 report estimating the economic impact of
asylum seekers and refugees on the European Union found that investing
in refugees can yield a number of economic dividends to host countries,
including boosts in demand, contributions to the labor supply (including filling skill gaps), complementary labor skills (often leading to new
job opportunities and higher wages for natives), more entrepreneurship
(resulting in wealth creation, new jobs for locals, and expansion of international trade and investment), increased diversity and innovation, a
younger workforce, and eventually fiscal contributions.91 Based on IMF
calculations, the report states, “Investing one euro in refugee assistance
can yield nearly two euros in economic benefits within five years.” The
report adds, “This is likely to be an underestimate of refugees’ economic

88. Bryan Caplan and Vipul Naik, “A Radical Case for Open Borders,” in
Powell, Economics of Immigration, 189.
89. John Kennan, “Open Borders,” Review of Economic Dynamics 16 (2013): L11.
90. Lant Pritchett, Let Their People Come: Breaking the Gridlock on International Labor Mobility (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2006).
91. Philippe Legrain, Refugees Work: A Humanitarian Investment That Yields
Economic Dividends (Tent Foundation and Open Political Economy Network,
May 2016), 19–41, http://www.opennetwork.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
Tent-Open-Refugees-Work_V13.pdf.
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contribution, since it does not include their dynamic contribution to
enterprise and growth.”92
A 2016 study investigated three Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda,
two of which provided cash aid while the other provided in-kind aid
in the form of food. The researchers found that the two cash camps
increased real income within a 10-km radius by an equivalent of 63 percent and 96 percent of the average host-country per capita income
around the camps, exceeding “the value of per-refugee [World Food
Program] assistance.” The in-kind camp, however, put “slight downward
pressure on [food] prices. This adversely affects local producers, who
compete with cheap food assistance.” Host-country households also
experienced “a small negative spillover.”93 This suggests that cash transfers would be preferable to in-kind assistance.
Using longitudinal data on Danish workers between 1991 and 2008,
economists Mette Foged and Giovanni Peri examined the impact that
the influx of refugees had on low-skilled natives. The two found that “less
skilled native workers responded to refugee-country immigration, mainly
composed of low-educated individuals in manual-intensive jobs, by
increasing significantly their mobility towards more complex occupations
and away from manual tasks. Immigration also increased native low skilled
wages and made them more likely to move out of the municipality.”94 The
authors observed no increase in unemployment or decrease in employment for unskilled natives.
A 2014 study conducted by the Humanitarian Innovation Project and
the Refugee Studies Center at Oxford University did extensive research
on 1,593 refugees in two rural settlements in Uganda and the capital of
Kampala, finding that refugees made positive contributions to the country’s economy. These contributions included the purchasing of goods
and services from Ugandan businesses, job creation, and provision of
human capital.95 This led the authors to label the claim that refugees are
an economic burden a “myth.”
92. Legrain, Refugees Work, 22, see page 59 for calculations.
93. J. Edward Taylor and others, “Economic Impact of Refugees,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 113,
no. 27 (2016): 7450.
94. Mette Foged and Giovanni Peri, “Immigrants’ Effects on Native Workers:
New Analysis on Longitudinal Data,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8961, March
2015, 29, http://ftp.iza.org/dp8961.pdf.
95. Alexander Betts and others, Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular
Assumptions (Oxford: Humanitarian Innovation Project and Refugee Studies
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol57/iss1/4
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Common Objections to Immigration
“In America,” writes historian David Gerber,
law and policy have been mobilized to structure and at times limit
immigration. The ideological sources of this evolution have been complex. Persisting alongside the recognition of the need for immigrant
labor has been nativism, which has manifested itself in the fear and dislike of foreigners and the perception that immigration destabilizes politics, society, and culture. Popular nativist feeling has always possessed
an emotional, bigoted component that invites political leaders to seek
gain in recognizing and exploiting the passions of the electorate. But
nativism need not always be racist or mean-spirited; those who want
the state to limit immigration and access to citizenship may have little
against immigrants, and instead may be concerned about the welfare of
the nation’s established residents.96

This nativist impulse in America can be traced back to colonial times
and anxieties over non-British immigrants. These prejudices extended
to Catholics (especially Irish), Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans, Jews, Slavs,
Italians, Greeks, and so forth.97 In turn, various restrictions followed.
For example, a literacy test for immigrants “first came to a vote in Congress in 1897 and was overwhelmingly passed by the House and cleared a
majority in the Senate.”98 The literacy test eventually became law in 1917.
This “literacy test was an overture to the Emergency Quota Act passed in
1921, the Immigration Act of 1924, and, eventually, the National Origins
Act passed in 1929.”99
Attempts to restrict immigration seem to have stemmed from a fear
that immigrants were hurting the economy. Harvard’s Claudia Goldin
notes, “Almost all serious calls for the literacy test were preceded by economic downturns, some of major proportion, and few economic downturns of the era were not accompanied by a call for restriction in the halls
Center, Oxford University, 2014), 16–20, https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publica
tions/other/refugee-economies-2014.pdf.
96. David A. Gerber, American Immigration: A Very Short Introduction
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15–16.
97. For a general, brief overview of this history, see Gerber, American Immigration, in full.
98. Claudia Goldin, “The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction
in the United States, 1890 to 1921,” in The Regulated Economy: A Historical
Approach to Political Economy, ed. Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 227.
99. Goldin, “Political Economy of Immigration Restriction,” 237–38.
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of Congress. Unemployment and labor unrest were clearly in the minds of
legislators in the 1897 and 1898 votes, and economic conditions had worsened just as the 1915 literacy test came to a vote. The major recession just
following World War I was a factor in the Emergency Quota Act.”100 Many
Progressive Era economists “defended exclusionary labor and immigration legislation on grounds that the labor force should be rid of unfit workers, whom they labeled parasites, the unemployable, low-wage races, and
the industrial residuum. Removing the unfit, went the argument, would
uplift superior, deserving workers.”101
One of the recommended reforms was a “tariff ” on immigrant labor
(a minimum wage). Princeton economist Thomas Leonard explains, “By
pushing firms to hire only the most able immigrant workers, a mandated
minimum wage for immigrants would reduce the quantity of immigrants and also select for higher quality immigrants. . . . Progressive
labor reformers embraced the minimum wage for its power to exclude
as well as to uplift. The minimum wage test would, more efficiently than
the literacy test, target the inferior races of southern and eastern Europe
by identifying inferiority not with illiteracy but with low labor productivity—the inability to command a minimum wage.”102 Recent analyses
also find that between 1910 and 1930, increased immigration within US
cities created political backlash. Cities cut public spending and redistribution and favored more anti-immigrant politicians and legislation,
despite the economic benefits brought about by immigrants.103
Today, for many rich-country natives, objections to immigration still
hold considerable weight largely because they concern the immediate
welfare of native workers. Of course, it is worth putting the economic
well-being of these workers in perspective. For example, the US poverty
threshold as of 2018 is $12,140 for a one-person household and $25,100
for a four-person household.104 These households are still within the
100. Goldin, “Political Economy of Immigration Restriction,” 239.
101. Thomas C. Leonard, “Retrospectives: Eugenics and Economics in the
Progressive Era,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 4 (2005): 207–8.
102. Thomas C. Leonard, Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics, and American
Economics in the Progressive Era (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2016), 159.
103. Marco Tabellini, “Gifts of the Immigrants, Woes of the Natives: Lessons
from the Age of Mass Migration,” Job Market Paper, January 12, 2018, http://
economics.mit.edu/files/13646.
104. US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Poverty Guidelines, https://aspe.hhs
.gov/poverty-guidelines.
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richest 20 percent of the world’s population.105 Nonetheless, it is worth
addressing some of the most common objections to immigration, which
include:
•
•
•
•
•

Immigrants “steal” native jobs.
Immigrants depress native wages.
Immigrants undermine host country culture and institutions.
Immigrants are a fiscal burden and increase the welfare state.
Immigrants are criminals and terrorists.

“Stealing” Jobs
“That immigrants ‘take our jobs’ is probably the most repeated and most
economically ignorant objection to immigration,” writes economist
Benjamin Powell.106 Aside from the implicit and problematic assumption that jobs in host countries somehow belong to natives, the notion
that there is a fixed amount of jobs is economically unsound. “In the
market’s process of creative destruction,” Powell says, “jobs are created
and destroyed all the time.” He continues, “Since 1950, there has been
massive entry of women, baby boomers, and immigrants into the work
force. . . . The civilian labor force grew from around 60 million workers
in 1950 to more than 150 million workers today. Yet there has been no
long-term increase in the unemployment rate. In 1950, the unemployment rate was 5.2 percent, and in 2007, the year before the current recession started, the unemployment rate was 4.6 percent. As more people
enter the labor force, more people get jobs.”107
In a policy paper appropriately titled “Do Migrants Take the Jobs
of Native Workers?” economist Amelie Constant found no correlation
between unemployment and immigration rates in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.108 Instead,
105. See the calculations at “How Rich Am I?” Giving What We Can, https://
www.givingwhatwecan.org/get-involved/how-rich-am-i/.
106. Benjamin Powell, “An Economic Case for Immigration,” June 7, 2010,
Library of Economics and Liberty, http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/
y2010/Powellimmigration.html.
107. Powell, “Economic Case for Immigration.” The numbers for the civilian labor force are https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11000000.
108. Amelie F. Constant, “Do Migrants Take the Jobs of Native Workers?”
IZA World of Labor 10 (May 2014): 7, https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/10/
pdfs/do-migrants-take-the-jobs-of-native-workers.pdf. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental
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she concluded that “immigrants do not take native workers’ jobs in
the long term,” but instead “stimulate job creation through increased
production, self-employment, entrepreneurship, and innovation. They
also provide opportunities for native workers to upgrade their occupation and specialize in higher-skill jobs.”109 Relying on US Census data
between 1980 to 2000, a 2016 working paper found that each immigrant
generates about 1.2 jobs each within his or her new host cities.110 A survey of the economic literature by Peter Leeson and Zachary Gochenour
revealed “that native employment is largely unaffected by immigration”
(with most influential studies showing zero or even positive effects).111
Similarly, a 2017 literature review by the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) found that immigration has little effect on native employment
(although the work hours of native teens and employment of prior
immigrants are slightly reduced).112
In summary, although some job loss may occur in the short run (as
is common with any change to the economy), the long-run effect of
immigration on employment is neutral to positive.
Depressed Wages
A basic understanding of the laws of supply and demand would suggest that as the supply of labor increases (via immigration), wages fall.
However, this perspective fails to take into account the idea that “immigrants who increase the supply of labor also demand goods and services,
causing the demand for labor to increase. This means that the effect of
immigration on wages shifts from being a theoretical question to being
an empirical one.”113 What does the empirical evidence suggest? One
economic organization with thirty-five member countries. The mission of the
OECD is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social wellbeing of people around the world.
109. Constant, “Do Migrants Take the Jobs of Native Workers?” 9.
110. Gihoon Hong and John McLaren, “Are Immigrants a Shot in the Arm
for the Local Economy?” NBER Working Paper, June 22, 2016, 41, http://www
.people.virginia.edu/~jem6x/hong%20mclaren%200615%20shot%20in%20the
%20arm.pdf.
111. Leeson and Gochenour, “Economic Effects of International Labor
Mobility,” 21.
112. Francine D. Blau and Christopher Mackie, eds., The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration (Washington, DC: National Academies Press,
2017), 268.
113. Powell, “Economic Case for Immigration.”
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study looked at the elimination of the bracero (“manual laborer”) program under John F. Kennedy, which had allowed for the importation of
Mexican guest workers after the early days of World War II. Following
the war, the program focused primarily on agricultural labor, bringing
in about a half million Mexican seasonal laborers per year. Though the
bracero program was ended to protect and improve wages for domestic
workers, the authors found “that bracero exclusion failed to raise wages
or substantially raise employment for domestic workers in the sector.”114
According to the 2017 NAS report, most empirical research shows
that “the impact of immigration on wages of natives overall is very
small.”115 However, “native dropouts tend to be more negatively affected
by immigration than better-educated natives. Some research also suggests that, among those with low skill levels, the negative effect on natives’
wages may be larger for disadvantaged minorities.” Yet, these negative
effects “tend to be smaller (or even positive)” when periods of ten years
or longer are considered.116 In fact, research suggests “that immigration to the United States between 1990 and 2006 reduced the wages of
natives without high-school degrees by only 0.7 percent in the short run
and increased their wages by 0.6–1.7 percent in the long run.”117
Similar to the effects of employment, low-skill native wages may
be depressed in the short run, but long-run effects tend to be zero to
positive.
Culture and Institutions
Another objection is what is known as the “epidemiological case,” which
argues that immigrants may bring with them foreign values that undermine the culture and institutions of the host country. In essence, immigrants transmit to rich countries those elements that make their source
114. Michael A. Clemens, Ethan G. Lewis, and Hannah M. Postel, “Immigration Restrictions as Active Labor Market Policy: Evidence from the Mexican
Bracero Exclusion,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 10512, January 2017, 31, http://ftp
.iza.org/dp10512.pdf.
115. Blau and Mackie, Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,
267. See also Giovanni Peri, “Do Immigrant Workers Depress the Wages of
Native Workers?” IZA World of Labor 42 (May 2014), https://wol.iza.org/
uploads/articles/42/pdfs/do-immigrant-workers-depress-the-wages-of-native
-workers.pdf?v=1.
116. Blau and Mackie, Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, 267.
117. Leeson and Gochenour, “Economic Effects of International Labor
Mobility,” 19, emphasis in original.
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countries poor. What makes this rather prejudiced argument all the
more jarring is the fact that it has virtually no supporting evidence.
Unfortunately, very little empirical research has been conducted exploring the impact of immigrants on cultural, political, and economic institutions at all. However, the research that is available should calm fears
and actually provide reasons for optimism. For example, there is no
association between growth of total-factor productivity (TFP) in rich
countries and the ratio of migrants from low-income countries, indicating that migrants do not “contaminate” their new homes with the low
productivity of their source countries.118
The Canada-based Fraser Institute publishes its oft-cited Economic
Freedom of the World report annually. Its indicator—known as the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index—defines economic freedom
based on five major areas: (1) size of the government, (2) legal system
and the security of property rights, (3) stability of the currency, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation of labor, credit, and
business. According to the institute’s most recent report (which looks at
data from 2015), countries with more economic freedom had considerably higher per-capita incomes and economic growth.119 Relying on this
index, a 2015 study found that a larger immigration population marginally increases the economic freedom of the host country’s institutions. No negative impacts on economic freedom were found.120 Several
authors from this study looked at Israel during the 1990s as a natural
experiment in mass migration. During the 1990s, Israel’s population
grew by 20 percent due to immigrants from the former Soviet Union.
Yet, instead of experiencing decline, Israel shot up “from 15% below the
global average [in economic freedom] to 12% above it and improv[ed] its
118. Michael A. Clemens and Lant Pritchett, “The New Economic Case
for Migration Restrictions: An Assessment,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 9730,
February 2016, 31–34, http://ftp.iza.org/dp9730.pdf. While migrants from lowincome countries may not be associated with TFP, a 2017 World Bank survey of
the literature found that, “on balance, total immigrant effects on labor productivity are statistically insignificant to positive” with “statistically significant positive effects” for TFP. Sharmila Devadas, Threat or Help? The Effects of Unskilled
Immigrant Workers on National Productivity Growth, World Bank Research and
Policy Briefs, no. 6, March 2017, 2, emphasis added.
119. James Gwartney, Robert A. Lawson, and Joshua C. Hall, eds., Economic
Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report (Fraser Institute, 2017), https://www
.fraserinstitute.org/studies/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2017-annual-report.
120. J. R. Clark and others, “Does Immigration Impact Institutions?” Public
Choice 163, no. 3 (June 2015): 321–35.
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ranking among countries by 47 places.”121 Similarly, a 2017 study found
that higher diversity—measured by levels of ethnolinguistic and cultural fractionalization—predicts higher levels of economic freedom.122
While this particular study mainly discusses development economics,
the correlation between high diversity and high economic freedom is
an important aspect of the immigration debate. Barring members of
different ethnolinguistic groups from entering the country may actually
be holding back economic development.
How well are immigrants integrating into their new home countries?
According to a 2015 analysis by the National Academy of Sciences, “current immigrants and their descendants are integrating into U.S. society” in a variety of ways, including through educational attainment,
employment and earnings, residential dispersion, and even English pro
ficiency.123 In fact, the NAS reports that language integration “is happening as rapidly or faster now than it did for the earlier waves of mainly
European immigrants in the 20th century.”124 Economist Jacob Vigdor
argues that “newly arrived immigrants are better assimilated along multiple dimensions than their predecessors—even before accounting for
the fact that immigrants are always least assimilated when they first
arrive in the United States.”125 A 2017 survey of around fifteen hundred Muslims throughout Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, and
the UK also found that integration has been quite successful.126 For
121. Benjamin Powell, J. R. Clark, and Alex Nowrasteh, “Does Mass Immigration Destroy Institutions? 1990s Israel as a Natural Experiment,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 141 (2017): 88.
122. Indra de Soysa and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, “Does Social
Diversity Impede Sound Economic Management? An Empirical Analysis,
1980–2012,” Social Science Research 62 (February 2017): 272–90. Cultural heterogeneity has also been found to have positive impacts on long-term economic growth. See Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia, “Migration, Diversity, and
Economic Growth,” World Development 89 (January 2017): 227–39.
123. Mary C. Waters and Marisa Gerstein Pineau, eds., The Integration of
Immigrants into American Society (Washington, DC: National Academies Press,
2015), 3.
124. Waters and Pineau, Integration of Immigrants into American Society, 6.
125. Jacob Vigdor, “The Civic and Cultural Assimilation of Immigrants to
the United States,” in Powell, Economics of Immigration, 71.
126. Yasemin El-Menouar, Muslims in Europe: Integrated but Not Accepted?
(Gutersloh, Ger.: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017), https://www.bertelsmann-stif
tung.de/en/publications/publication/did/results-and-country-profiles-mus
lims-in-europe/.
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example, about 75 percent of German-born Muslims report German as
their first language, even though only 20 percent of Muslim immigrants
report similarly. “The trend that language skills improve with each successive generation is equally apparent in France, the United Kingdom,
Austria and Switzerland.”127 The survey also found that “a large majority
of the Muslims living in the countries studied have (very) frequent contact with non-Muslims in their leisure time”: 87 percent of Swiss Muslims, 78 percent of German Muslims and French Muslims, 68 percent
of those in the United Kingdom, and 62 percent of those in Austria.128
Ironically, a 2015 OECD study found that challenges to integration “do
not increase with the share of immigrants in the population. . . . If anything, countries that are home to high proportions of immigrants tend
to have better integration outcomes.”129
In short, worries that foreigners will undermine the culture and institutions of host countries are misplaced. Immigrants tend to assimilate
rather well and often improve the economic freedom within countries.
Fiscal Burden and Welfare Cost
Many worry that an influx of low-skill, low-education workers would
inflate the welfare state and drain the fiscal budget. Admittedly, accurately assessing the fiscal impact of immigration is difficult, since multiple factors have to be taken into account. “For instance,” according
to policy analyst Alex Nowrasteh, “a low-skilled immigrant might
not pay income tax, but his or her employer will likely make a higher
profit and pay additional taxes as a result of hiring the worker. If those
effects are not included, then the benefits will be underestimated.”130
Or consider economist Jacob Vigdor’s estimate that each new immigrant adds 11.6 cents to the value of the average home in their community, “boosting the National US taxable housing value by an estimated
$3.7 trillion.”131 There is also the issue of whether to measure the impact
127. El-Menouar, Muslims in Europe, 5.
128. El-Menouar, Muslims in Europe, 6.
129. OECD/European Union, Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), 11, http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Indi
cators-of-Immigrant-Integration-2015.pdf.
130. Alex Nowrasteh, citing Vigdor in “The Fiscal Impact of Immigration,”
in Powell, Economics of Immigration, 42.
131. Nowrasteh, “Fiscal Impact of Immigration,” 43; Jacob Vigdor, Immigration and the Revival of American Cities: From Preserving Manufacturing Jobs to
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of first-generation immigrants only or to include their descendants.
As one study explains, “In forward-looking projections, the logic for
including second generation effects is straightforward: Even if children
of immigrants are native-born citizens, the costs and benefits that they
generate would not have been realized without the initial addition to
the population of the immigrant parent(s). . . . Costs associated with
educating the children of immigrants that accrue during the analysis
period are included in the fiscal estimate; however, a good case can
be made for treating these expenditures as an investment, due to the
strongly positive association between level of education and eventual
contributions to tax revenues.”132 After all these factors are considered,
what does the literature show? A 2017 literature review by the National
Academy of Sciences finds that the “fiscal impacts of immigrants are
generally positive at the federal level and negative at the state and local
levels” because state and local governments are the main providers of
education benefits. The authors of the review are also quick to point out,
“The net fiscal impact for any U.S. resident, immigrant or native-born, is
negative. When fiscal sustainability is assumed to result in future spending cuts and tax increases, immigrants are more valuable than nativeborn Americans (that is, their net fiscal impact is greater in a positive
direction).”133
These findings echo those of Nowrasteh’s review of the literature.
According to Nowrasteh, between 1950 and 2000, “immigration grew
the US economy and produced more net tax revenue. . . . The lowskilled first generation consumed more welfare than they paid in taxes,
but their descendants more than compensated for that initial deficit
by producing a more positive dependency ratio for entitlement programs, leading to a slightly positive contribution to the federal budget in
the long run.”134 While many economic models “find that immigrants
slightly diminish net tax revenue for state and local governments,” they
increase the federal net tax revenue by more than the state and local

Strengthening the Housing Market (New York: Partnership for a New American
Economy and Americas Society/Council of the Americas, 2013), 11–12.
132. Blau and Mackie, Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,
356–57.
133. Blau and Mackie, Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,
461, emphasis added.
134. Nowrasteh, “Fiscal Impact of Immigration,” 57.
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decrease.135 Furthermore, “there is little evidence that migrants choose
their state destination based on the generosity of the welfare system. . . .
New immigrants are mainly choosing to reside in states with low levels
of social welfare spending and growing economies and are moving away
from states with high levels of social welfare spending and low economic
growth.”136 Nonetheless, even if welfare spending did increase due to
immigration (evidence suggests quite the opposite),137 this would be
an argument for increasing restrictions on welfare, not immigration.138
Overall, as Nowrasteh concludes, “The economic benefits of immigration are unambiguous and large, but the fiscal effects are dependent
upon the specifics of government policy over a long time period, which
means that the net fiscal impact of immigration could be negative while
the economic benefit is simultaneously positive. Looking at the results
of all of these studies, the fiscal impacts of immigration are mostly positive, but they are all relatively small.”139
Terrorism and Crime
In the post-9/11 world, concerns over terrorism have reshaped immigration policy and transformed it into a matter of national security.140
Given the fact that all nineteen terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks
were foreign nationals who entered the country via legal means, fears
of an equally devastating attack based on similar circumstances are
135. Nowrasteh, “Fiscal Impact of Immigration,” 57.
136. Nowrasteh, “Fiscal Impact of Immigration,” 45.
137. See Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the US
and Europe: A World of Difference (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004);
Maureen A. Eger, “Even in Sweden: The Effect of Immigration on Support for
Welfare State Spending,” European Sociological Review 26, no. 2 (2010): 203–17;
Stuart N. Soroka and others, “Migration and Welfare State Spending,” European
Political Science Review 8, no. 2 (2016): 173–94; Clark and others, “Does Immigration Impact Institutions?”; and Marco Tabellini, “Gifts of the Immigrants,
Woes of the Natives.”
138. Alex Nowrasteh and Sophie Cole, “Building a Wall around the Welfare State, Instead of the Country,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 732, July 25, 2013,
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa732_web_1.pdf.
139. Nowrasteh, “Fiscal Impact of Immigration,” 63.
140. See Muzaffar Chishti and Claire Bergeron, “Post-9/11 Policies Dramatically Alter the U.S. Immigration Landscape,” Migration Policy Institute,
September 8, 2011, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/post-911-policies
-dramatically-alter-us-immigration-landscape.
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wholly understandable. But what is the actual risk? How likely is it
that an American citizen will be murdered by a foreign-born terrorist? Alex Nowrasteh has crunched the numbers and finds that between
1975 through the end of 2015, the chance of an American dying in a
terrorist attack committed by a foreigner on US soil was 1 in 3,609,709
per year. This includes those who perished in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The chance of an American dying in a terrorist attack perpetuated by a
refugee was 1 in 3,638,587,094 per year, while dying in an attack by an
illegal immigrant was 1 in 10,915,761,281 per year.141 These chances are
infinitesimally small. As others have cheekily pointed out, these data
demonstrate that an American is more likely to meet her demise by a
falling vending machine, a lightning strike, or her clothes melting or
igniting.142 Furthermore, a 2017 analysis of 20 OECD countries and
187 countries of origin between 1980 and 2010 found that while a larger
number of foreigners in a country does increase the probability of a
terrorist attack, it is no bigger than the effect a larger domestic population has on domestic terror. “Overall,” the authors write, “we thus conclude that migrants are not more likely to become terrorists compared
to the nationals of the country they live in.”143 The researchers also find
that “introducing strict laws that regulate the integration and rights of
migrants does not seem to be effective in preventing terror attacks from
foreign-born residents. . . . To the contrary, repressions of migrants
already living in the country alienate substantial shares of the population, which overall increases rather than reduces the risk of terror.”144
141. Alex Nowrasteh, “Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis,” Cato
Policy Analysis No. 798, September 13, 2016, 5, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato
.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa798_2.pdf.
142. Lauren Leatherby, “Trump Clampdown: Four Charts on the US Refugee Program,” Financial Times, January 27, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/
a8798b58-e347-11e6-8405-9e5580d6e5fb; Zack Beauchamp, “You’re More Likely
to Be Killed by Your Own Clothes Than by an Immigrant Terrorist,” Vox, January 28, 2017, https://www.vox.com/2016/9/13/12901950/terrorism-immigrants
-clothes. See also Micah Zenko, “America Is a Safe Place,” Politics, Power, and Preventive Action (blog), February 24, 2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/02/24/
america-is-a-safe-place/.
143. Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner, and Paul Schaudt, “The Effect of Migration on Terror—Made at Home or Imported from Abroad?” CESifo Working
Paper 6441, April 2017, 30, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2976273.
144. Dreher, Gassebner, and Schaudt, “Effect of Migration on Terror,” 26.
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What about crime rates? A 2015 literature review by the National
Academy of Sciences divided the issue into two questions: (1) Are immigrants more likely to commit crimes than the native born? and (2) Do
immigrants adversely affect the overall crime rate? The review found
that immigrants in the United States “are in fact much less likely to commit crimes than natives, and the presence of large numbers of immigrants seems to lower the crimes rates.”145 Multiple studies demonstrate
that “young native-born men are much more likely to commit crimes
than comparable foreign-born men.”146 Unfortunately, this anticrime
advantage tends to wane in subsequent generations. As the children of
immigrants assimilate into American culture, their crime rates begin to
catch up with their native-born peers. Numerous studies over the last
twenty years have also found that there tends to be an inverse relationship between immigration and crime rates. In fact, “these studies . . .
found that the crime drop observed between 1990 and 2000 can partially be explained by increases in immigration.”147
Conclusion
“Literally millions of lives are affected in a serious and long-term manner by immigration restrictions,” writes philosopher Michael Huemer.
“Were these restrictions lifted, millions of people would see greatly
expanded opportunities and would take the chance to drastically alter
their lives for the better. This makes immigration law a strong candidate
for the most harmful body of law in America today. In view of this, it
is particularly troubling that these restrictions appear to have so little
justification.”148 This overview of the economic literature demonstrates
that liberalized immigration could be (and has been) one of the most
145. Waters and Pineau, Integration of Immigrants into American Society, 327,
emphasis in original.
146. Waters and Pineau, Integration of Immigrants into American Society,
328–29.
147. Waters and Pineau, Integration of Immigrants into American Society,
330. See also Ruben G. Rumbaut, “Appendix D: Undocumented Immigration and Rates of Crime and Imprisonment: Popular Myths and Empirical
Realities,” in The Role of Local Police: Striking a Balance between Immigration
Enforcement and Civil Liberties, ed. Mary Malina (Washington, DC: Police
Foundation, 2009).
148. Michael Huemer, “Is There a Right to Immigrate?” Social Theory and
Practice 26, no. 3 (2010): 461.
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effective antipoverty programs around. Moreover, empirical analysis
demonstrates that the fears surrounding immigration are often misplaced. Official statements from the LDS Church have made it clear
that its leadership supports humane, inclusive immigration policies,
reminding members and the world that “how we treat each other as
children of God” is a “bedrock moral issue.”149 This bedrock moral issue
is further supported by the scriptural responsibility toward the poor
and “the stranger.” Members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints place special emphasis on sustaining our leaders and lifting
up the poor and needy. In the case of immigration, we can seek to do
both by welcoming migrants with open arms and advocating for far less
restrictive immigration policies.

Walker A. Wright graduated from the University of North Texas with an MBA
in strategic management and a BBA in organizational behavior and human
resource management. He has been previously published in SquareTwo, BYU
Studies Quarterly, Dialogue, and Graziadio Business Review. His online writing
can be found at the blogs Difficult Run, Worlds Without End, and Times and
Seasons. He lives in Denton, Texas, with his wife.
149. “Immigration: Church Issues New Statement,” Newsroom—The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, June 10, 2011, http://www.mormonnews
room.org/article/immigration-church-issues-new-statement.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2018

39

